This Article is concerned with the present failure of the international community to ensure that pirates are brought to justice and punished for violently attacking the ships and crews of many nationalities that pass through shared public sea lanes. Although nations have implemented a variety of measures aimed at disrupting piratical attacks-for example, by forming naval patrols that roam pirate-infested waters-such measures alone are not sufficient to deter all or most acts of piracy. Instead, pirate attacks are on the rise.1 4 Criminal prosecutions of pirates, however, could do much to deter and prevent future piratical attacks." Therefore, this Article argues that piracy is a serious crime affecting the international community and investigates international legal solutions ripe for consideration. This Article further suggests that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the best international forum to bring an end to the culture of impunity that surrounds piracy offenses.
The reasons for including piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC are many. As a theoretical matter, piracy would fit well within the ICC's mandate, which provides it with jurisdiction over serious crimes of concern to the international community." Piracy is a serious crime, the quintessential crime of 
) (quoting Richard Goldstone for the idea that international criminal tribunals will provide an enforcement mechanism to punish those who commit atrocities, thereby aiding in deterring future atrocities).
16
The Preamble to the Rome Statute states that the parties have agreed to create a permanent ICC with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. Rome Statute at Preamble, 1 4 (cited in note 15). In addition, Article 1 also emphasizes that the court will have jurisdiction over the "most serious crimes of international concern." Rome Statute, Art 1 (cited in note 15). At the present time, the crimes over which the ICC does have jurisdiction are genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The parties to the Rome Statute also have declared that the ICC will have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
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Dutton Bringing Pirates to justice 201 customary international law, and the original universal jurisdiction crime." The reality is that modern piracy involves many of the same violent and cruel actssuch as murder, kidnapping, and hostage-taking-that are used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes over which the ICC currently has jurisdiction. Moreover, like the other crimes included within the court's jurisdiction, piracy is a crime that is well-suited to the complementarity regime utilized by the ICC treaty, whereby the ICC only obtains jurisdiction over a crime if the state which would otherwise have jurisdiction over it is unwilling or unable to prosecute the crime." Nations are not prosecuting acts of piracy with any regularity, either because they are unwilling or unable to do so." Just as the ICC can fill the impunity gap for the crimes already within its jurisdiction, it can also fill the impunity gap for piracy. Finally, as a practical matter, there is infrastructure already in place that can be easily adapted to cover piracy: the ICC exists, it may sit regionally if necessary, and piracy can be added to the ICC's mandate by an optional protocol.
2 0
Part II of this Article traces the historical legal background of the crime of piracy and the international legal framework that has emerged to govern the provision is adopted defining that crime and setting out the conditions under which the court can exercise jurisdiction over it. See id, Art 5. 17 See United States v Smith, 18 US (5 Wheat) 153, 161 (1820) ("The common law, too, recognizes and punishes piracy as an offence, not just against its own municipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations (which is part of the common law), as an offence against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race. universally cognizable and that it would be hard to find any authority suggesting that piracy was not covered by universal jurisdiction); Edwin D. Dickinson, Is The Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 Hary L Rev 334, 335-39 (1925) (suggesting pirates as enemies of all mankind were subject to universal jurisdiction since the early seventeenth century).
18
The Rome Statute provides in the Preamble that the ICC "shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions." Rome Statute at Preamble, 10 (cited in note 15). Therefore, as explained in detail under Article 17, a case is not admissible to the ICC unless the state which has jurisdiction over it is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution."
Id, Art 17, 1 1 (cited in note 15). 19 See sources cited in note 10. 20 Pursuant to Article 3 of the Rome Statute, the ICC is to sit in The Hague in the Netherlands; however, " [t] he Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable." Id, Art 3 (cited in note 15). According to the working papers prepared in connection with the implementation of the Rome Statute, in determining whether to sit outside The Hague, the ICC should consider the practicality of such an arrangement and whether it would be in the interests of justice to do so. prosecution of pirates. It further describes certain features of the international legal framework that operate to limit its effectiveness as a tool for combating acts of modern piracy. Part III describes the modern piracy problem in more detail and addresses some of the international community's responses to the problem. Part III also examines the culture of impunity that surrounds piracy and the failure of nations to prosecute acts of piracy with any regularity. In addition, Part III briefly addresses Kenya's agreement to try pirates captured by the naval forces of various countries and the flaws associated with relying on Kenya as a solution to end impunity for piracy. Part IV provides background for the argument that an international tribunal should handle piracy prosecutions by describing the literature that discusses the merits of using international courtsas opposed to national courts-to adjudicate cases involving international crimes like piracy. Finally, Part V explains why including piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC is the best international solution, desirable on both theoretical and practical grounds.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATING PIRACY

A. Universal Jurisdiction
Piracy, under customary international law, is the oldest crime to which universal jurisdiction 2 1 applies. 22 For centuries, nations have deemed pirates to be hostis humanigeneris (enemies of all mankind), such that any nation may use its own domestic laws to try to punish those committing piracy, regardless of the
21
In 2000, a group of scholars and jurists met at Princeton University to examine the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. In the document resulting from that meeting, entitled "The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction," universal jurisdiction was defined as "criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction." Stephen Macedo, ed, Princeton Principles on Universal jurisdiction 28 (2001 
Summer 2010
Dutton
203
pirates' nationalities or where the piratical acts took place. 23 It is the general heinousness of piratical acts and the fact that they are directed against ships and persons of many nationalities-disrupting international trade and commercethat warrants universal jurisdiction. 24 Indeed, the US Supreme Court early on recognized the pirate an enemy of mankind over which states could exercise universal jurisdiction because the pirate "commits hostilities upon the subjects and property of any and all nations, without regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public authority." 25 Customary international law provides no agreed-upon definition for what acts constitute the international crime of piracy. 26 However, at present there are two international treaties that, at least in part, govern piratical acts and provide the jurisdictional bases for nations to prosecute such acts domestically. The first such treaty is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 2 7 -a treaty with some 160 states parties which specifically defines piracy. 28 The second is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Thus, UNCLOS defines piracy as a criminal act, the vast majority of nations are party to it, and it even contains a provision, which, at least in theory, requires nations to prosecute piratical acts.
3 ' Nevertheless, as a tool for combating piracy, UNCLOS is lacking in several respects. First, even though the Convention requires nations to cooperate in repressing piracy, there is no mechanism to enforce this duty. Rather, nations must incorporate UNCLOS provisions into domestic law before they can prosecute acts of piracy. Yet, apparently few states have taken this essential step, thereby making it impossible for them to cooperate in repressing piracy by using the provisions of UNCLOS." Moreover, only one major case has been brought using the piracy provisions of UNCLOS: a Belgian prosecution against Greenpeace. 38 Second, UNCLOS's definition of piracy includes only those acts that occur on the high seas or outside the territory of any state.
3 ' However, most acts of piracy today occur in territorial waters and ports, rather than in international waters, meaning that UNCLOS does not provide a jurisdictional basis to prosecute those acts.
40 A nation's territorial waters generally extend twelve miles from its coastline, and only that nation has jurisdiction to prosecute wrongful acts occurring in its sovereign territory. 41 In addition, island states like Indonesia and the Philippines may claim within their territory all waters between the outermost points of their outermost islands. 42 Therefore, attacks occurring within the straits, gulfs, and archipelagos where international ships must pass 34 UNCLOS, Art 101 (cited in note 27). and at ports where they must dock are not subject to UNCLOS. 43 Nevertheless, some commentators estimate that up to 70 percent of recent attacks have occurred in such territorial waters. 44 Third, at least some language in UNCLOS suggests that for an act to be deemed piracy, two ships must be involved. Article 101(a)(i) defines acts of piracy to include those illegal acts committed by the crew or passengers of a ship "against another ship." 45 Although Article 101(a)(ii) does not include this same wording to define an act of piracy, commentators differ on whether piracy under the Convention includes internal seizures, violence by the crew, or actions by passengers of one ship against that same ship or its passengers.
46 If two ships are required, however, then potential pirates need only to pose as passengers or crew and thereafter hold the ship ransom in order to avoid being defined as pirates under UNCLOS.
Finally, under UNCLOS an act is not piracy unless that act is committed for "private ends." 47 The SUA Convention was enacted, at least in part, to ensure that politically motivated attacks on ships could be prosecuted by the international community as acts of piracy. 49 Pursuant to Article 3, a prohibited offense is committed by anyone who: (1) "seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation;" 0 (2) "performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship;"s' or (3) attempts to do any of the above.
5 2 In contrast to UNCLOS, the SUA Convention applies to offenses committed even in territorial or archipelagic waters or in port, as long as the ship is scheduled for international navigation.
5 3 In terms of jurisdiction, any signatory state may prosecute violations of the SUA Convention provided that: (1) the offense was against a ship flying its flag; (2) the offense occurred in its territory; (3) the offense was committed by a national of the state; or (4) a national of the state was a victim of the offense. 
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See, for example, Bahar, 40 Vand J Transnatl L at 27-37 (cited in note 22) (arguing that the "private ends" language in UNCLOS does not preclude treating terrorism on the high seas as piracy inasmuch as the "private ends" language was likely meant to exclude from covered those unrecognized insurgents that were acting solely against a foreign government and ships acting pursuant to public authority). Bahar cites to a number of commentators who he claims mistakenly or without analysis conclude that the "private ends" language in UNCLOS prohibits prosecuting terrorist acts on the high seas using UNCLOS. See 
52
Id, Art 3(2)(a). 
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Nevertheless, although the SUA Convention does appear to broadly prohibit offenses that are consistent with modern piracy, like UNCLOS, the SUA Convention is flawed. First, notwithstanding that the Convention requires the signatory state to either extradite or prosecute an offender found in its territory," the SUA Convention has apparently only been used in one instance." Thus, whatever the Convention's merits as a tool to combat piracy, nations do not appear to be using it. One commentator has suggested there is some confusion about the treaty's applicability, in that some believe it can only be used to prosecute acts committed by terrorists."
Second, even though the SUA Convention, unlike UNCLOS, theoretically covers attacks while ships are docked or in territorial waters, the statute also typically requires that the attack "is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship."" Based on this language, using the SUA Convention to prosecute attacks-even violent attacks-while a ship is docked may be difficult.
Finally, although the SUA Convention does apply broadly to offenses on ships regardless of location as long as they are engaged in international navigation, offenses can still go unpunished because only signatory states with a nexus to the offense are entitled to prosecute." For example, SUA signatory states may prosecute if the offense is committed against or on board a ship flying a flag of that state, the offense occurs within the state's territory or is committed by one of its nationals, or where a state's national is seized, threatened, injured, or killed in connection with the offense. 0 This is in contrast to UNCLOS, which at least permits-and possibly requires-all signatory nations to prosecute, whether or not they have a nexus to the offense. Therefore, if a signatory state with the required nexus to the offense does not prosecute, or if the states with a nexus to the offense are not signatories to the SUA Convention, pirates and maritime terrorists will go unpunished. 
III. MODERN PIRACY AND RESPONSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
A. The Nature of Modern Piracy
Over the last decade, pirate attacks on ships and crews have become an increasingly common occurrence.64 The IMB reports that the 306 pirate attacks in the first nine months of 2009 already exceeded the total number of attacks in 2008." Furthermore, it is important to note that the IMB tracks only those incidents that are reported. The true number of actual and attempted pirate attacks could be much higher, as it is generally believed that many ship owners do not report attacks for fear their ships will be delayed during an investigation or that their insurance premiums may rise as a result. 66 Moreover, the 1MB
reports that Somali pirates, in particular, are extending their territorial reach and now threaten the southern part of the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandab Straits, and the east coast of Oman, as well as the Gulf of Aden and the east coast of Somalia.6 Most commentators suggest that money and opportunity explain this increase in piratical attacks. Modern pirates are primarily motivated by the wealth they can obtain by holding the cargo and crew of merchant ships for ransom. 6 Some authorities estimate that ransom payments made to pirates for. the safe return of crew totaled more than $80 million for the year 2008. Estimates further put the average ransom at about $2 million, with "mere gunmen" in Somalia earning up to $20,000 for participating in an attack-this in a country where the average income is $500 per year and many are at risk of starvation. 70 These lucrative potential payoffs have also had the effect of increasing the stakes of piracy, which also likely explains the increasingly violent nature of the attacks. For example, the use of guns more than doubled in the first nine months of 2009 compared to the first nine months of 2008."
In terms of opportunity, the huge amount of commercial maritime traffic provides pirates with plenty of targets. Seaborne trade increased some 300 percent from 1970 to 2006, from about 2.5 billion tons to about 7.5 billion tons per year. 72 About 80 percent of all global freight is shipped by sea, and some twelve to fifteen million containers are on the world's oceans at any given time.
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Much of that freight travels through narrow and congested maritime chokepoints, such as the Malacca Straits, the Strait of Bab el-Mandab, the Hormuz Straits, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal. 74 Ships must significantly reduce their speed to ensure safe passage through these narrow sea lanes, making the large and slow-moving merchant vessels easy targets for pirates who can quickly overtake them using small, fast, and maneuverable skiffs.
7 1 While the slow-moving merchant vessels are often large, they are also often manned with small crews who are unable to sufficiently guard the ship 68 See, for example, Report: The Role of the European Union in combating piray at 4 (cited in note 1)
(suggesting that pirate attacks in waters off the Somali coast have become a regular source of income for inhabitants of Somalia because the ransoms paid are huge and the risks to the pirates are minimal); Potgieter, 31 Strategic Rev S Afr at 70 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that pirates are after money, cargo, and ransom from ship owners, either for themselves or to finance militias on shore).
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See note 13. Regarding individual ransom payments, the Ukrainian ship Faina, which was carrying thirty-three T-72 tanks, air defense systems, and rocket launchers, was held for five months until the pirates were paid a ransom of $3.2 million dollars. The Saudi ship, Sirius Star, carrying two million barrels of oil, was released after about two months when pirates received a $3 million ransom. Money and opportunity may also explain why much of modern piracy is now purportedly being carried out by well-organized pirate gangs-some of which are funded by investors who can share in the profitable rewards of this violent and disruptive activity. 79 Some pirates have done so well that they are now wealthy enough to hire others to mount the attacks: they invest in the weapons, boats, and communications equipment, but they do not perform any attacks, thereby permitting them to profit with little risk of arrest or prosecution.so
B. Responses of the International Community
The international community appears to understand the severity of the problem of modern piracy and also that it will not go away unless the international community takes aggressive action to combat it. For example, because of concerns about the consequences of acts of piracy on world trade The multinational naval force, which operated under a rotating command by the US, Germany, and Denmark, included naval vessels from some fifteen states. In January 2009, CTF-150 was replaced by CTF-151, which is also a multinational naval force that combines military force, intelligence sharing and coordinated patrols with the specific goal of countering and suppressing acts of piracy." The EU has also launched its own counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia using frigates and naval patrol aircraft." Non-western nations are also participating in these counter-piracy operations. Pakistan, Japan, and Turkey are among the nations that have contributed to CTF-151. China, Russia, and India have not formally joined a particular task force, but they have coordinated their actions with other forces. 8 8
The UN Security Council has backed these coordinated efforts to combat piracy with a number of resolutions authorizing military action against Somali pirates at sea and on Somali territory." In a resolution dated June 2, 2008, the Security Council authorized coalition navies for an initial period of six months to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use "all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery. 84 See, for example, id; Nairobi Report at 36 (cited in note 7). 85 See Nairobi Report at 36 (cited in note 7) (describing CTF-150 as a force of some sixteen nations that patrol from the straits of Hormuz to the south of the Indian Ocean for terrorist activity). See also United States Navy, New Counter-Piracy Task Force Established (jan 8, 2009), online at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story-id=41687 (visited Apr 5, 2010) (describing the creation of CFT-151 to combat the piracy threat off the coast of Somalia).
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the EU." In addition, nations in the areas closest to important shipping lanes have also been coordinating separately to address the problem of piracy. In January 2009, seventeen states from the areas surrounding the Western Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea met in Djibouti, and at the conclusion of the meeting adopted a Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy (the "Djibouti Code").' 0 0 The Djibouti Code covers, among other things, the possibilities of shared patrol operations by ship and by air, as well as the use of piracy information exchange centers in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen. Nine states-Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen-signed the code at the conclusion of the meeting. In short, the international community and individual nations are apparently willing to expend time, resources, and money to combat piracy and the threat it poses to the safety and security of ships and crews from around the globe, as well as to international trade, humanitarian aid deliveries, the stability of nations, and the environment. However, even though the international community seems to be uniquely focused on the problem of modern piracy and ways to prevent or combat it, pirate attacks have only become more common and more violent after these protective measures began in 2007.101 Despite the presence of these multinational naval forces, in the last week of 2009, Somali pirates seized a British-flagged chemical tanker and a Greek bulk carrier.1 0 2 Furthermore, as discussed in more detail below, the successful pirates-whose attacks occur notwithstanding the coordinated efforts of the international community to prevent them-face little threat of prosecution and punishment. Although some attacks may have been thwarted due to the cooperative efforts of the international community to combat piracy, few of the pirates are being prosecuted despite the existence of universal jurisdiction and the international treaties discussed above.' 0 3 Apparently, states have used universal jurisdiction as a basis for prosecuting acts of piracy only in very few instanceseven though such jurisdiction has existed for hundreds of years.' 0 4 States have used UNCLOS and the SUA Convention provisions even more rarely as a basis on which to prosecute acts of piracy.' 5 Furthermore, it is unlikely that many states have even incorporated those treaty provisions into their national laws.o Failing to incorporate treaty provisions aside, some states do not even have national laws that criminalize piracy, and where states have such laws, they are not uniform in how they operate or the conduct they prohibit. See UN SCOR 63rd Sess, 6046th mtg at 9 (statement of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) (noting that the current reality of impunity also limits the effectiveness of the response to piracy and armed robbery).
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Bringing Pirates to justice Dutton disarmed and released, while only 212 were sent somewhere to be prosecuted."' If nations are not willing and able to prosecute the pirates they capture, however, then the culture of impunity cannot end. Pirates will understand that even if captured in the act, they stand a good chance of being released and allowed to continue with their disruptive and violent behavior. Notably, however, the lack of sufficient laws alone cannot explain the reluctance of nations to help end impunity for piracy because many nations have neither tried to use the laws that exist nor adopted domestic legislation criminalizing the conduct that comprises modern piracy. For example, even with sufficient laws, the lack of domestic law enforcement capabilities in certain interested states may make it virtually impossible for them to prosecute many acts of piracy. Some territorial states or states whose nationals are committing pirate attacks are either failed states or otherwise lack the institutional capacity to bring pirates to justice, making it unrealistic to expect that these states could alone manage the burden of prosecutions."' In his Congressional testimony, Rear Admiral Baumgartner made just this point when explaining the situation in Somalia. He noted that in contrast to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore-which border the Malacca Straits-the states surrounding the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa generally lack the maritime capabilities to respond to acts of piracy in their waters, and that Somalia in particular lacks judicial and law enforcement capacity to address piracy."' Moreover, where the acts of piracy occur within territorial waters-and most do"'-UNCLOS would give only the coastal state the jurisdiction to try the pirates according to its domestic laws." 9 However, if domestic laws or domestic law enforcement capabilities are lacking, then absent the willingness of other nations to invoke universal jurisdiction or the provisions 115 of the SUA Convention, those pirates necessarily go unpunished. Even so, other nations wishing to prosecute would likely have to rely on local authorities to provide them with custody over the suspected pirates located within sovereign territory-something that will be difficult if the state is a failed one or otherwise lacking in institutional capacity.
Even for states with significant institutional capacity, prosecuting pirates may prove difficult from both an evidentiary and a cost-benefit perspective, particularly because the prosecuting state usually has to jail and possibly take responsibility for the pirate if convicted. Ships may be attacked by nationals of one state, registered under the flag of a different state, owned by nationals of another state, insured by a company in yet another state, operated by a crew comprised of nationals from a number of other states, and transporting cargo from a number of other nations. 120 As a result, most interested nations would have to collect evidence from a location thousands of miles away from home, the pirates and witnesses would have to be transported to the interested country for trial, and the pirates would then likely have to be provided translation services.'
21 Therefore, although many nations may be the direct victims of a piracy incident and have a special interest in seeing the pirates brought to justice, that interest may not be enough to compel them to take on the burden and costs of such an international prosecution. Given that these difficulties discourage even directly victimized nations from prosecuting pirates, one can understand why nations with a less direct interest may not want to prosecute.
Beyond the difficulties and costs associated with prosecution, there is evidence that nations-particularly Western nations-are avoiding their duty to prosecute pirates because of fears that, if convicted, those pirates will then seek political asylum for themselves and their families. Roger Middleton, a researcher for Chatham House, the London-based think tank, explains, "These countries 120 See, for example, Kraska, 28 Comp Strategy at 207 (cited in note 79) (emphasizing the logistical difficulties associated with prosecuting pirates because the cases involve suspects from one country, witnesses and victims from other countries, and vessels that are registered in or carrying cargo from other countries). In fact, data collected by InterCargo News indicates that twentyeight countries were affected by just nine acts of piracy against nine bulk carriers between Nevertheless, while relying on Kenya is a convenient solution for nations wishing to avoid the difficulties and costs associated with prosecuting pirates in their own domestic courts, it offers only a partial solution to the impunity problem for piracy. Kenya only has so much capacity and likely will not be able or willing to shoulder the entire burden of bringing pirates to justice. Recent statistics indicate that even without the addition of the suspected pirates, the Kenyan judiciary system is significantly overburdened. Kenya has approximately 53,000 prisoners, yet its national capacity allows it to house about 16,000.128 Its current backlog of cases is over 870,000.129 Furthermore, there are only three prosecutors in the Mombasa office of the Department of Public Prosecutions, and they have indicated they will be unable to take on the extra burden of piracy prosecutions without additional help from prosecutors who would have to travel from Nairobi-and countries other than Kenya would have to provide travel expenses. 130 But even with a few additional prosecutors, Kenya still would not have the capacity to handle a significantly greater number of piracy cases. Kenyan prosecutors report that they are facing complex legal challenges that require additional specialized assistance-such as paralegal case management support and assistance with legal research. ' Indeed, Kenya's capacity to expeditiously adjudicate piracy cases is hindered by what its own authorities admit are outdated and formal rules of evidence which render inadmissible many modern forms of evidence or make other forms of evidence admissible only through onerous procedures.1
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Beyond the problems relating to capacity, some have raised concerns that Kenya is denying suspected pirates basic human rights as well as access to the fair trial processes the international community expects defendants to receive.
128
See id.
129
See id. 
See id.
132 See id at 6. In fact, a Navy judge Advocate General who participated in an early Kenya trial of Somali pirates during 2006 described some of the issues with the rules of evidence used in Kenya. For example, although US naval personnel photographed the pirate skiff and the weapons contained on it after capture, none of those photos was admissible at trial because Kenya requires the actual photographer to testify concerning the photos, and flying the photographer to Kenya would have been prohibitively expensive. In sum, it is unlikely that Kenya will have sufficient capacity or ability to deliver the type of efficient and fair trial processes that would allow it to serve as the solution to ending the culture of impunity that surrounds piracy. Only recently, Kenya's Internal Security Mfinister complained that the piracy cases it already has to deal with have overstretched the capacity of Kenya's security agencies and courts.' 39 As argued below, having an international court with authority to adjudicate piracy cases should help address the many legal, practical, and political obstacles that prevent nations from prosecuting acts of piracy and bring an end to impunity for this serious international crime.
IV. THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
WITH AUTHORITY To ADJUDICATE PIRACY CASES
A. The National Versus International Debate
Historically, states have enforced violations of international criminal law using two approaches: (1) domestication and adjudication of international law at the national level and (2) adjudication of international law using supranational courts or tribunals, such as the ICC. According to Professor Antonio Cassese, however, many legal scholars argue that the best judicial forum for prosecution of criminal offenses is national courts, rather than supranational courts.1 40 There are two main reasons for this conclusion. First, national courts usually are physically closest to the location where the criminal offense was committed. Therefore, they should also be closest to the evidence necessary to prosecute the offense: namely, the defendant, the victims, the witnesses, and the physical evidence.141 In addition, the proximity to the offense means that the trial will occur in the language of the defendant and his counsel, and allow the defendant-if convicted-to serve his sentence in his own country, close to his family.' 4 2 National courts should also be closest to the community whose values and rules were breached as a result of the crime. A local trial may be better able to heal and provide justice to the community that has suffered from the crimes committed.1 43 Second, proceeding through national courts is often considered less expensive than adjudicating criminal offenses in supranational tribunals for many of the same reasons cited above: proximity to the offense, the witnesses, and the evidence." Nevertheless, there are problems with relying on national courts to prosecute particularly serious offenses that concern or cause harm to the international community more generally. First, national courts may not have sufficient legal capacity or expertise to adjudicate serious crimes of international concern.' 45 For example, some states may not have the proper legislative provisions to cover the type of criminality at issue. 146 Even if they do, the matters at issue may be too complicated for national courts-their police, prosecutors, and judges-either because of the type of crime committed or because, for example, the crime involves persons and evidence from more than one state.1 4 7 Second, it may be difficult for national courts to administer justice in an unbiased and fair manner.' 4 8 Nations have a significant stake in the outcome of any prosecution concerning their own nationals, and their courts may be subject to influence. Also, even beyond concerns about influence, national courts may not have the procedural rules in place to adequately protect the accused. Furthermore, proceeding through national courts allow for uniformity in the provisions for punishment of those committing international crimes. These failings at the national level explain the international community's increasing reliance on international courts as a forum to prosecute serious international crimes. 149 International courts can be established with the legal capacity (legislation, judges, and personnel) to adjudicate the crimes in question.'s In addition, international courts should be able to provide justice that is fairer and more impartial than justice in national courts, given that the judges will not be linked to the state where the crime was committed or the defendants that committed the crime."' Finally, international courts can apply international laws and rules, and thereby ensure not only that fair procedures are followed, but also that there is uniformity in the application of laws and the sentencing of offenders.'
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As discussed below, an analysis of the aforementioned factors supports international adjudication of piracy cases. Although there may be no reason to abandon efforts to encourage national and regional prosecutions of piracy offenses,' 53 a supranational enforcement mechanism can solve many of the problems associated with such prosecutions, including those problems that are currently leading to an impunity gap for piracy offenses.
B. Balancing The Above Factors Shows The Appeal Of An
International Criminal Court With Authority To Adjudicate Piracy Cases
1.
Physical proximity of the court to the piracy offense.
In the case of piracy, it is unlikely that even a national court would be located close to the offense and the evidence necessary to prosecute it. Pirate attacks usually involve perpetrators, victims, and witnesses of many nationalities. Furthermore, the crime usually occurs in waters located thousands of miles from the states that have been most directly harmed by the attack-for example, those states with nationals who were victims of the attack either because they owned the ship or some of its cargo, or because they were crewmembers.' 54 In the one piracy case the US is prosecuting in New York, the attack occurred against the US-flagged commercial ship, the MV Maersk Alabama, in waters located near Somalia by Somali pirates, including the defendant, Abdul Wali-i- 151 See, for example, Cassese, Raionale for International Criminaljusdce at 127 (cited in note 140).
See id.
In his article entitled Regionaliadon Of Internadonal Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary
Exploration, Professor William Burke-White argues that balancing the various factors described above leads to the conclusion that the "effectiveness, cost, and legitimacy of international criminal justice appear to be maximized through enforcement at the regional level" as opposed to the supranational level or national level. See Burke-White, 38 Tex Intl L J at 742-43 (cited in note 141). His argument, however, is about international criminal justice generally, rather than about any specific international crime, such as piracy. In the piracy context, regional enforcement mechanisms-such as relying on Kenya to try piracy cases-have some of the same failings as national enforcement mechanisms. For example, many nations and regions may lack the legal capacity and expertise required to fairly adjudicate piracy cases. Thus, although we may not wish to abandon regional enforcement mechanisms for piracy, in the case of Kenya, it requires funds and training to improve the legal capacity of its police, prosecutors, and courts. See generally UNODC Report (cited in note 130). 154 See note 120.
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Musi."' Thus, the case is proceeding far from the defendant's home; evidence and witnesses will have to be brought to New York; and if convicted, the defendant will serve his sentence in the US. Furthermore, although Somalia is located close to this offense and many other recent pirate attacks, piracy trials in the courts of Somalia are not presently a viable means to bring pirates to justice. Somalia is essentially a failed state in the midst of internal conflict that has been ongoing for almost two decades."' Moreover, there are problems with relying on Kenya to fill the impunity gap for piracy. Among other things, Kenya does not appear to have the legal expertise and capacity to try large numbers of piracy cases, and its ability to ensure fair trials and respect the human rights of defendants has been criticized.' 57 Piracy is unique in that it may be less important for a piracy trial to occur in a national court than for other international crimes. Unlike other international crimes-such as genocide, which is directed against one particular ethnicity or community-piracy attacks are directed against many different nations and victims. It is because the pirate attacks the persons and property of all nations that in 1844 the United States Supreme Court recognized the pirate as an enemy of all mankind over which states could exercise universal jurisdiction.' Thus, piracy affects not just one nation, but rather the international community-not only because the victims are from many nations, but also because piracy threatens the safety and security of international trade, humanitarian aid deliveries, the stability of nations, and the environment. Therefore, it is the kind of crime over which an international criminal court could properly pass judgment on behalf of the world community.
In sum, although an international criminal court with authority to adjudicate piracy cases may not be located close to the offense, this is a shortcoming also shared by most national courts that could prosecute piracy offenses. In fact, one of the reasons why states almost always refuse to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts is precisely because the offenses involve so many different nationalities and occur so far away."' An international court could fill that impunity gap and properly pass judgment on the suspected pirates whose victims include the entire world community.
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See Pilkington, Somali teen, guardian.co.uk (cited in note 103). 156 See Security Council Res 1851, UN Doc S/RES/1851 at 1 (Dec 16, 2008) 159 See notes 120 and 121.
Vol. 11 No. 1 2. The financial costs of adjudicating piracy offenses.
Although prosecuting piracy offenses in an international court may be costly, national prosecutions-and even the prosecutions in Kenya-are also costly due to the international nature of piracy offenses. One of the main reasons states are not prosecuting piracy offenses domestically even when their nationals are directly affected by the attacks is because of the perceived financial costs of prosecution.' 6 0 After all, in most instances, the affected states would have to transport the defendants long distances, jail them while they await trial, pay for lawyers and translators, and pay to bring witnesses to the site of the trial.
Kenya is an excellent case in point. Victims and witnesses from around the world still need to be transported there to appear at trial, and translators need to be provided. In addition, organizations have stepped up to provide lawyers to defendants who are not otherwise entitled to state-provided defense attorneys."' According to some reports, Kenya has already received about $2.4 million in funding to try piracy cases.' 62 Others estimate that Kenya and other countries in the region have already received close to $7 million for piracy trials.' 63 Nevertheless, Kenyan authorities have stated that they need millions in additional funds to help them build the capacity to prosecute the approximately one hundred pirates that they are currently hosting.'
64 Yet, as of October 2009, only ten of the suspected pirates brought to Kenya had been tried and sentenced."' In any event, even if having Kenya try piracy cases is a relatively cost-effective solution to the problem of impunity for piracy, cost savings may come at the price of sacrificing defendants' human rights and rights to fair judicial processes.
Finally, although supporting an international criminal court with authority to adjudicate piracy cases would be costly, the costs are likely commensurate with those necessarily required to try cases of attacks committed at sea involving perpetrators, victims, and witnesses from around the world. In fact, a comparison of the ICC's 2010 budget with the amounts already spent to support 
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See Sanga, Country Declines to Host Detention Camp (cited in note 125). See UNODC Report at 6-16 (cited in note 130) (discussing that more than $2 million in funds would be needed to help Kenya improve its legal capacity to adjudicate piracy cases).
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See Sanga, Country Declines to Host Detention Camp (cited in note 125).
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Dutton trials in Kenya provides some evidence that pirates could be brought to justice by an international court at a cost that is not prohibitive. The ICC's budget for 2010 is approximately $140 million; however, though the amount may sound large, it supports an administrative, prosecutorial, and judicial staff of more than 700."' Furthermore, with those funds, ICC prosecutors travel all over the world to investigate difficult and significant cases involving genocides, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and the court hires translators and provides funds for witness travel.
67 If $140 million is a guide to what it costs to operate a court with 700 people dedicated to handling investigations and prosecutions of a variety of international crimes, it may be possible to fund a special piracy chamber comprised of only twenty staff members for a small portion of that budget. If one considers that twenty staff members is only 1/35 of the staff currently used to operate the ICC on a budget of $140 million per year, even a generous estimate suggests that it may be possible to operate a dedicated piracy court on less than $10 million per annum. Given the amounts already spent on trials in Kenya, and the additional amounts needed to provide Kenya with the capacity to try those cases-especially as it only has three prosecutors in its Mombasa office"'-spending $10 million (or even $20 million) on a dedicated and specialized piracy team of experienced administrative, prosecutorial, and judicial staff would not seem extraordinary.
Legal capacity and expertise of the court.
In the case of international crimes, supranational enforcement mechanisms tend to have greater legal capacity, judicial resources, and expertise than would many national courts-especially those located in the territory where the international crimes occurred. For example, an international court may have more precise legal definitions of piracy at its disposal, since any grant of authority to an international criminal court to adjudicate piracy cases would necessarily have to include definitions of piracy offenses falling under its jurisdiction. In addition, administrative personnel, prosecutors, and judges could be chosen based on their competence and expertise in international criminal law generally, as well as their competence and expertise in handling the types of offenses that constitute piracy more specifically.
By contrast, many national courts that would have jurisdiction over piracy cases are significantly lacking in legal capacity, judicial resources, and expertise. Many states do not have laws that would permit them to prosecute piracy offenses, either because they have not incorporated the provisions of UNCLOS'" or the SUA Convention, or because they do not have domestic laws that criminalize piracy. 170 In addition, many nations-like Somalia-that are located in piracy-prone territories would be unequipped to prosecute piracy cases even if they had sufficient laws on their books. They simply do not have the stability, institutions, or personnel to allow them to investigate and fairly adjudicate such matters. ' Furthermore, even with the help of the international community, states in the African region will have difficulty providing the legal capacity and expertise to adjudicate piracy cases that an international court could offer. The Kenyan experience is telling. Despite the significant sums already provided to Kenya by Europe and the US to try piracy cases, Kenyan authorities indicate they do not have the legal capacity or resources to expeditiously prosecute the approximately one hundred pirates that are in their custody.1 7 2 Furthermore, although Tanzania, another country in the region, has apparently indicated it would be willing to have its courts handle piracy cases with funding assistance from the international community, its laws would have to be amended for it to have jurisdiction over piracy offenses occurring outside of Tanzanian waters."' Moreover, legislative amendments may be necessary to ensure that evidentiary and procedural rules promote efficient trials. 74 In short, these regional courts are lacking in legal capacity and expertise-qualities that should necessarily be present in any international criminal court with authority to adjudicate piracy cases.
4. Ability of the court to ensure the unbiased and fair administration of justice.
The general consensus is that international courts are less subject to political manipulation and bias, and should be able to administer justice more fairly not only because of that lack of bias, but also because such courts can be established with rules and procedures that ensure the defendant a fair trial. Even See note 10. 171 See notes 116 and 117. 172 See Sanga, Country Declnes to Host Detention Camp (cited in note 125). See generally UNODC Report at 6-16 (cited in note 130). 173 See UNODC Report at 13 (cited in note 130). 174 See id.
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Bringing Pirates to Justice Dutton 229 though piracy offenses may not be committed by governments or government forces, some governments may benefit from it, either because they receive bribes or payoffs or because they recognize that piracy is a viable way for people in the community to earn a living that they may not otherwise be able to earn."' Thus, some governments may have little incentive to initiate proceedings against citizens who are committing the attacks. An international criminal court with authority to adjudicate piracy cases would not face similar incentives to forgo piracy prosecutions.
In addition, even if states are not making political decisions to forgo piracy prosecutions, their laws and practices may be such that they cannot deliver the kind of humanitarian treatment and fair trials the international community expects all defendants will receive. As noted above, commentators have criticized Kenya for failing to treat suspect pirates humanely and for denying them the kind of rights associated with fair trial processes."' An international criminal court can apply international principles, rules, and procedures that would meet the humanitarian and fair trial standards required by the international community. Furthermore, an international court would have the benefit of ensuring greater uniformity in adjudicating piracy offenses. At present, states have very diverse laws and sentencing possibilities as they relate to piracy offenses.' While uniformity in trial and sentencing standards are not required, certainly such uniformity can add to the overall fairness of the criminal processes as they relate to piracy.
Conclusion.
In sum, piracy is an international problem, and an international criminal court with authority to adjudicate piracy can bring pirates to justice and end the culture of impunity that currently reigns. In many cases, states are unwilling to shoulder the burden of prosecuting pirates because of the evidentiary difficulties and costs associated with hosting piracy trials. In other cases, states are unable to shoulder the burden of trying pirates because they do not have the legal capacity and judicial expertise required to investigate and prosecute such offenses. In both instances, an international criminal court could fill the impunity gap 175 See, for example, Nairobi Report at 15 (cited in note 7) (noting that pirates in Somalia can earn much more from attacking ships than they can through the scarce legal employment available in Somalia); Ploch, et al, Piray off the Horn of Afiica at 7 (cited in note 77) (stating that some have alleged that regional and local officials in the Puntland region of Somalia are alleged to have facilitated and profited from piracy). 176 See notes 133 and 137. 177 See, for example, Pira!y-Threat at Sea: A Risk Analysis at 29 (cited in note 107) (stating that national laws regarding piracy are very diverse: some do not even mention piracy, while some require many conditions be met before an offense can qualify as an act of piracy).
Vol. Summer 2010 crimes against humanity, and war crimes."' According to the Preamble of the Rome Statute, the ICC was created with the aim of ending impunity for the perpetrators of "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole."' 82 In addition, because it is the duty of each state to exercise jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes, the jurisdiction of the ICC was created to be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction: it will only investigate and prosecute where a national state with jurisdiction over a case is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." 83 One reason I propose adding piracy to the jurisdiction of the ICC is because the ICC already exists. As a result, including piracy within the ICC's jurisdiction would be less costly than establishing an entirely new international tribunal to adjudicate piracy cases. The ICC has been in operation for more than seven years, and it has operating procedures, facilities, and a large staff. Furthermore, if states wish the ICC to adjudicate piracy cases in those regions where piracy offenses most frequently occur, the court is permitted to sit regionally.
8 4 Having the ICC sit regionally could potentially produce additional cost-savings because at least some defendants or witnesses may not have to be transported to the ICC's current headquarters in The Hague. If the court does sit regionally, another benefit may result: the ICC may be able to share its expertise and resources with local judges and lawyers, thereby building local capacity to prosecute piracy cases.
Although piracy could be added to the crimes included within the court's jurisdiction by amendment to the Rome Statute, proceeding by way of an optional protocol would arguably be more efficient and expeditious.' Amendments to the Rome Statute may only occur upon adoption by two-thirds of the states parties, which must then be ratified by seven-eighths of the states parties in order to take effect. Even so, states that have not accepted the amendment have certain rights to withdraw as states parties to the Rome Statute.'
86 By contrast, an optional protocol will come into effect for those states that sign it.' Any such protocol should create a separate chamber within the ICC to handle piracy cases specifically.'1 8
Having a separate chamber could ensure that piracy cases would be investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated by those with the necessary expertise. Such a focus on expertise should also produce benefits in terms of fairness, speed, and efficiency. In addition, having a special chamber for piracy cases should make decisions about whether to have such a chamber sit regionally easier because only personnel specifically assigned to that chamber would be involved in and affected by the decision.
The theoretical and practical reasons for including piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC by optional protocol and for using a separate chamber to adjudicate piracy cases are discussed below.
B. The Theoretical and Practical Reasons to Include Piracy
Within the ICC's Jurisdiction
1.
Piracy is a serious crime of concern to the international community.
There are many theoretical and practical reasons to include piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Piracy, like the other crimes already covered by the ICC treaty, is a serious crime of concern to the international community as a whole. Piracy is the first crime over which states decided the exercise of universal jurisdiction was appropriate, both because of the heinousness of piratical attacks and also because piracy by its very nature harms the world community as a whole.' Indeed, pirate attacks occur all over the world, 190 and the victims of attacks are similarly diverse."' Furthermore, piracy disrupts international trade, most of which passes through the world's shared sea lanes,' and even creates the risk of a major international environmental disaster.' Piracy also disrupts foreign aid, contributing to instability in already impoverished and unstable nations.' 94 In addition, even though a pirate attack cannot be compared to a genocide that involves the mass murder of hundreds or thousands of people, its inclusion within the ICC will not trivialize the court or its mission in ending impunity for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. Pirate attacks are characterized by increasing cruelty and violence which will certainly not cease until pirates are brought to justice.' 9 s In fact, pirates are committing some of the very acts that are included within the definition of acts that can constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of an attack against a civilian population: namely, murder, torture, and rape.1 96 Nor should it matter that with respect to the present crimes covered by the Rome Statute, the ICC Prosecutor has stated that his investigatory focus is on "those who bear most responsibility" or are the masterminds of the criminal activity.'
7 Even if the masterminds behind the piracy remain hidden on shore, bringing so-called "'low-level"' pirates to trial should still be a priority, since they have committed serious crimes of international concern. Indeed, the so-called "low-level" pirates are those who threaten innocent civilians and hold them hostage at gunpoint in exchange for a portion of a ransom payment. In any event, the prosecution of lower-level pirates is a promising avenue towards obtaining the evidence necessary to prosecute the masterminds of the criminal activity. Notably, ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have both prosecuted lower-level perpetrators for precisely these reasons. Richard Goldstone, the former chief prosecutor for both the International Criminal Tribunals for both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, explained that his prosecutorial strategy necessarily required indicting non-leader perpetrators, especially because evidence against leaders was often more difficult to obtain and because indicting those at the lower levels could provide the building blocks necessary to indict those at the top.' Vol. The complementarity regime used by the ICC is also well-suited to piracy offenses. Under that regime, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction where the nation having jurisdiction over the offense is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.""' Under the Rome Statute, "unwillingness" includes instances where national proceedings are a sham or are inconsistent with an intention to bring the person to justice, either because such proceedings are unjustifiably delayed or are not being conducted independently or impartially. The idea behind including the "unwillingness" provision was to preclude the possibility of sham prosecutions aimed at shielding perpetrators through government participation in, or complicity with, the offense.
200 A nation's "inability" to prosecute includes instances where, because of the collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the nation cannot obtain the accused or the necessary evidence, or is otherwise unable to carry out the proceedings.
2 01 Thus, nations may, and are encouraged to, prosecute offenses nationally, but the ICC's complementarity regime provides another forum in which perpetrators can be brought to justice where national jurisdictions are either unwilling or unable to fight impunity.
Even if it is not based on the criteria for admissibility presently employed, a complementarity regime allowing the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over piracy cases can do much to end the culture of impunity that presently exists with respect to piracy offenses. The ICC could accept jurisdiction over cases that states are refusing to prosecute for a variety of reasons: some because they prefer not to bear the costs and risks associated with prosecuting pirates and others because they simply do not have the stability or judicial resources to do so. 202 Admittedly, a state's preference not to bear the costs of transporting witnesses or a state's fears concerning asylum claims may not constitute "unwillingness" in the same way currently envisioned by the ICC's complementarity regime because the concern is not with potential government involvement in the crime or other bias. However, "unwillingness" in the context of piracy cases may simply be a form of "inability" because nations-even wealthy nations-may not have sufficient resources to bear the burden of such costly prosecutions, particularly given that in many cases, the nation is only one of many victim nations. In any event, unwillingness should be judged by a standard that recognizes the precise difficulties associated with having any single nation shoulder the unique burden of adjudicating piracy cases.
In short, using the ICC's complementarity regime would allow states to continue to prosecute piracy cases when they determine they have a sufficient interest in the particular offense to justify the costs and difficulties associated with prosecution-such as the decision of the US to prosecute the pirate accused of hijacking the MV Maersk Alabama. In addition, employing such a regime could also ensure that nations do not simply release suspected pirates and allow them to return to their criminal activities. Those criminal activities pirates return to not only threaten and harm innocent lives, but also interfere with international trade, humanitarian aid, and the right of the world community to generally enjoy shared sea resources.
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3. That piracy was not included in the original ICC treaty is no bar to including it within the ICC's jurisdiction now.
The historical record indicates that the drafters of what later formed the basis of the Rome Statute considered piracy-to the extent it is defined by Article 3 of the SUA Convention-for inclusion within the ICC's jurisdiction along with a host of other crimes which were termed "treaty-based" crimes. 
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The 1994 ILC Draft Statute did not include piracy within the meaning of UNCLOS for consideration as a treaty crime within the jurisdiction of the proposed international criminal court. The ILC's stated reasons for declining to include piracy under Art 101 of UNCLOS were as follows: the provisions of UNCLOS require states to cooperate in repressing piracy, the treaty confers jurisdiction on the state seizing the pirate vessel, and the treaty covers a very wide range of acts. Therefore, "on balance," the ILC decided not to include piracy under UNCLOS as a crime over which the proposed international criminal court might exercise jurisdiction. See 1994 ILC Draft Statute at Commentary to Annex, Cmt 1 (cited in note 204).
Vol. 11 No. 1 confined the court's jurisdiction to the "core" crimes. 210 Nevertheless, since a significant number of states continued to insist that the court's jurisdiction should include terrorism and narcotics trafficking, Resolution E was adopted, recommending that a future Review Conference "consider the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and their inclusion in the list of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court." 2 1 1 Therefore, even though the ICC's jurisdiction is currently limited to the "core" crimes, at least some member states believe its jurisdiction should be expanded.
The historical record demonstrates that state delegations generally raised several objections to the inclusion of treaty-based crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. For example, some argued that limiting the number of crimes over which the court had jurisdiction would simplify negotiations and likely ensure more broad-based support for the court.21 Some states also suggested that including treaty crimes would create issues regarding individual criminal responsibility of nationals of states not parties to particular treaties and possibly make it more difficult for states not parties to those treaties to join the court.
13
They further expressed concern that including additional crimes could overburden the court, especially because they believed many of the treaty-based crimes could be better handled nationally.
2 14 Finally, with regard to terrorism in particular, states suggested the crime could be difficult to define. 215 None of these reasons for excluding treaty-based crimes from the ICC's jurisdiction, however, should now serve as a basis for refusing to include piracy crimes within the court's jurisdiction by optional protocol. First, the process of negotiating the Rome Statute is over. Therefore, raising the possibility of including piracy within the jurisdiction of the court will not impinge on negotiations or detract from support for the court. 216 In addition, because this proposal suggests proceeding by protocol, negotiations concerning piracy can proceed separate and apart from any negotiations presently underway with regard amending to the Rome Statute. Furthermore, proceeding by optional protocol and by a separate chamber for piracy cases can help separate piracy offenses from the crimes currently included within the Rome Statute. This would address any fears that including piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC would somehow detract from the ICC's mission to end impunity for the most atrocious crimes and punish those most responsible for them. In any event, as argued above, piracy is a serious crime of concern to the international community as a whole. In addition, questions of which states had or had not ratified certain treaties are now irrelevant. Piracy would be defined in connection with the optional protocol to the Rome Statute. And, one might expect that states would be very willing to ratify a protocol giving the ICC authority to prosecute piracy offenses. States are already turning pirates over to Kenya for prosecution, making it unlikely they would raise sovereignty concerns in connection with relinquishing suspected pirates to an international tribunal. Also, as noted above, many state representatives have already expressed support for an international tribunal to try piracy cases.
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Furthermore, although including piracy offenses within the jurisdiction of the ICC will certainly impose some burden on the ICC, it is well-equipped with significant resources and personnel at its disposal to handle that burden.
18
Indeed, if one creates a separate chamber to adjudicate piracy offenses, adding piracy to the jurisdiction of the ICC should not be overly burdensome or distract the court from its other duties. Moreover, this is not a situation where national courts have the resources and expertise to inexpensively and expeditiously try piracy cases. 219 One of the reasons that some states are still pushing to include terrorism and narcotics trafficking within the ICC's jurisdiction is because those offenses cause a great amount of harm to some states which are without the ability and resources to bring those criminals to justice. 220 Although larger "strongly believes that the Statute should provide for a mechanism of periodic review that would enable states parties to consider the addition of other crimes to the court's jurisdiction at a later stage. 220 For example, in responding to arguments that the ICC's jurisdiction should be confined to several "core" crimes, some states noted that the new court would not replace national courts, but would provide an option for adjudication of cases like terrorism and narcotics trafficking, which require large-scale intelligence gathering and other significant resources to prosecute-resources which
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Dutton countries like the US regularly prosecute narcotics trafficking crimes, even it has brought only one piracy case in the last century. Including piracy within the jurisdiction of the ICC could do much to close the impunity gap for piracy offenses. Finally, unlike the crime of terrorism-which some states object to including within the ICC's jurisdiction because of the difficulty of defining the crime so as to clearly distinguish between international terrorists and freedom fighters 2 2 1 -the crime of piracy can be defined. Nor should defining the crime be overwhelmingly difficult. The texts of UNCLOS and the SUA Convention already exist. There have also been some efforts by groups like the Comite Maritime International (CMI) to draft a model piracy act to address the perceived flaws in UNCLOS and the SUA Convention regarding their ability to capture the variety of acts that constitute modern piracy within their purview.
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In addition, defining the crime of piracy anew can have additional benefits beyond addressing flaws under the current international legal framework: drafters could include provisions regarding evidentiary and other standards necessary to make piracy prosecutions both efficient and fair, avoiding some of the problems associated with trials in Kenya. In any event, definitional difficulties should be no reason to allow pirates to escape justice. The other crimes included within the ICC had to be defined in order to be included in the Rome Statute, and states included aggression within the jurisdiction of the court, subject to it being defined. 223 Moreover, despite the difficulties of defining terrorism, there are states that support including it within the ICC's jurisdiction as evidenced by Resolution E.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a large and growing impunity gap for piracy that can only be closed if the international community decides to act to bring pirates to justice. Piracy is a serious crime of international concern that is only increasing in frequency and severity despite the unique ways in which the international community has been working together recently in an effort to repress and some states do not have. See 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report, 55, 82 (cited in note 208) (reporting some nations' push for expanding ICC jurisdiction to terrorism and drug crimes, in paragraph 55, and giving some reasons for including such crimes under the ICC, in 82). 221 (Aug 15, 2007) . 223 See Rome Statute, Art 5(2) (cited in note 15) (providing that the ICC will only exercise jurisdiction over aggression when a suitable definition is adopted).
TVol. 11 No. 1 240 combat piracy. 224 Although the international community may be thwarting some pirate attacks, what it is not doing is sending pirates a message that piracy will not be tolerated and that those who commit acts of piracy will be prosecuted and punished. Instead of prosecuting the pirates captured by naval forces patrolling pirate-infested waters, in many instances, nations are simply releasing pirates-even those who are "caught in the act." 2 25 Some pirates fare even better: they receive food and water before they are released to continue their criminal activities.226 Thus, not only do pirates see that "crime pays" when they receive a portion of the significant ransoms that are now being paid for the safe release of ships and their crews, but they also see that "crime pays" even when they are captured by naval patrols. Until the international community commits to bring pirates to justice regularly, it is unlikely pirates will conclude otherwise and change their behavior as a result.
This Article suggests that pirates should be brought to justice using the already extant ICC by way of an optional protocol to include piracy within the ICC's jurisdiction. Modern piracy is directed against victims from around the world, creates harms that are felt by the entire international community, and involves many of the same violent and cruel acts, such as murder, kidnapping, and hostage-taking, that are used to commit the crimes already within the ICC's jurisdiction. 227 Also, like the other crimes included within the court's jurisdiction, piracy is a crime well-suited to the complementarity regime designed to help end impunity for serious crimes of concern to the international community. Nations are not prosecuting piracy suspects with any regularity, either because they do not have the laws, capacity, or resources to handle such prosecutions, or because they do not want to bear by themselves the various burdens associated with an expensive and difficult prosecution that affects numerous nations. 2 28 The ICC could help end this culture of impunity regarding piracy offenses, and the burden of supporting the court's adjudication of piracy cases could be shared by the international community. It is true that acts of piracy will not entirely cease just because countries show pirates that they are willing to prosecute. However, closing the impunity gap is at least likely to deter some pirates who will learn that they will be punished in return for their crimes, rather than rewarded. 
